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Abstract 
A human mission to Mars will occur at some time in the coming decades.  When it does, it will be the end result 
of a complex network of interconnected design choices, systems analyses, technical optimizations, and non-technical 
compromises.  This mission will extend the technologies, engineering design, and systems analyses to new limits, and 
may very well be the most complex undertaking in human history.  It can be illustrated as a large menu, or as a large 
decision tree.  Whatever the visualization tool, there are numerous design decisions required to assemble a human 
Mars mission, and many of these interconnect with one another.  This paper examines these many decisions and further 
details a number of choices that are highly interwoven throughout the mission design.  The large quantity of variables 
and their interconnectedness results in a highly complex systems challenge, and the paper illustrates how a change in 
one variable results in ripples (sometimes unintended) throughout many other facets of the design.  The paper 
concludes with a discussion of some mission design variables that can be addressed first, and those that have already 
been addressed as a result of ongoing National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) developments, or as a 
result of decisions outside the technical arena.  It advocates the need for a “reference design” that can be used as a 
point of comparison, and to illustrate the system-wide impacts as design variables change. 
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Nomenclature 
AU Astronomical Unit 
kWe Kilowatt-electric 
 
Acronyms/Abbreviations 
Delta-V Change in Velocity  
DRA Design Reference Architecture 
EDL Entry, Descent and Landing 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
EZ Exploration Zone 
IMLEO  Initial Mass to Low Earth Orbit 
Isp Specific Impulse 
ISRU In Situ Resource Utilization 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
MAV Mars Ascent Vehicle 
MLP Mobile Launch Platform 
PLSS Portable Life Support System 
RF Radio Frequency 
ROI Region of Interest 
SLS Space Launch System 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
TMI Trans-Mars Injection 
VAB Vehicle Assembly Building 
 
1. Introduction 
NASA came into existence in 1958, and soon after its 
inception its engineers began imagining design solutions 
for sending human crews to the planet Mars.  Even before 
NASA, visionaries like Werner von Braun were 
calculating, dreaming, and documenting how humans 
could one day venture to our most Earth-like neighbor.  
Von Braun’s Das Marsprojekt [1] provided the first 
technical end-to-end design of a human Mars mission, 
and it set the standard for how human exploration 
missions would be analyzed. 
NASA’s early human Mars mission concepts were 
constructed following the same logic of von Braun’s 
analyses, concentrating mostly on the propulsive 
solutions for departing Earth, injecting to Mars, landing, 
and returning to Earth.  Early studies paid relatively little 
attention to the comfort of the human explorers or the 
details of what tasks these explorers would be doing once 
they arrived on the planet.  As the 1960s progressed, 
NASA’s human Mars studies became increasingly 
refined as mission planners absorbed Apollo flight 
experience and hardware designs and the first robotic 
missions began returning data from Mars.  The 1960s 
ended with Werner von Braun again advocating Mars 
exploration, this time addressing the Space Task Group 
and championing a human mission to be flown in 1982.  
As NASA entered the 1970s, human Mars missions took 
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a back seat to post-Apollo long-duration flights in Earth 
orbit and robotic exploration of the red planet, and it 
would not be until the 1980s that human Mars mission 
planning emerged again. 
Human Mars architectures proliferated in the 1980s, 
and have continued until present day [2].  Beginning with 
the Case for Mars conference and the Planetary Society, 
human Mars mission planning has continued with 
architectures of increasing complexity as part of the US 
government space initiatives, independent reports, and 
commercial Mars architecture studies.   
The common thread throughout all of this work is a 
series of choices that must be made, among a legion of 
options, to link the pieces of each human Mars mission 
architecture.  Von Braun’s initial focus on launch, 
propulsion and trajectory choices captured a large part of 
the essential physics, and subsequent studies filled in 
additional layers of nuance. 
2. Design Choices 
A myriad of decisions must be made before a human 
mission to Mars can be accomplished.  These begin with 
‘big picture’ architecture decisions, such as the primary 
focus of the mission and processes needed to leverage the 
costs, and drill all the way down to cargo handling 
procedures, trash disposal, and many others.  In fact, a 
matrix of these top-level decisions offers up to 5.3 x 1037 
possible combinations.  Of course, a selection in any one 
category could narrow the choices in a number of others, 
but the possibilities are nevertheless staggering.  A copy 
of the entire decision matrix, as it is now known, is 
shown in Table 1, but it will evolve as different designs 
and processes are matured. 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Mars Mission Decision Matrix 
 
 
  
Primary Program 
Focus
Mission Class
Level of Human 
Activity
Earth Based 
Mission Support
Cost Emphasis Reusability
Crew Launch 
Vehicle
Propellant 
and/or 
Logistics 
Launch 
Vehicle
Element 
Launch 
Vehicle
Launch 
Vehicle 
Shroud Size / 
SLS 2B Fairing
Earth-to-Orbit 
Flights per 
Expedition
Launch 
Vehicle Rate
Flags & Footprints / 
Lewis & Clark
Opposition Class - 
Short Stay (1-60 sols)
Robotic / 
Telerobotic
Continual Control
Low Cost / 
Gradual Build-Up
None
Space Launch 
System 
(SLS)/Orion
SLS SLS
8.4 m 
Diameter, 
Short Length
2 1 per year
Research Base / 
Antarctic Field Analog
Conjunction Class - 
Long Stay (300+ sols)
Expeditions
Moderate 
Intervention
High Cost  / 
Gradual Build-Up
In-Space 
Habitation
International International International
8.4 m 
Diameter, 
Long Length
4 2 per year
Primary Activity: 
Science & Research
All-Up vs. Split 
Mission
Human-Tended
No Daily 
Intervention
Low Cost / Fast 
Build-Up
In-Space 
Transportation
Commercial Commercial Commercial
10 m 
Diameter, 
Short Length
6 3 per year
Primary Activity: 
Resource Utilization
Continuous 
Presence
Minimal
High Cost / Fast 
Build-Up
Entry, Descent 
and Landing (EDL) 
and Ascent
Combination Combination Combination
10 m 
Diameter, 
Long Length
8 6 per year
Primary Activity: 
Human Expansion
Human 
Settlements
Surface Systems 12 m Diameter 10 +
Human 
Colonization
Infrastructure for 
Permanent 
Habitation
Mission Architecture / End State
Earth-to-Orbit
Transportation
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Table 1.  Mars Mission Decision Matrix (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial Orbit
Long-Term 
Staging
Supporting 
Space 
Infrastructure 
Mass
Orion
In-Space 
Refueling
Earth Return 
Mode
Cis-Lunar Propulsion Mars Orbit Propulsion
Chemical 
Propellant
In-Space 
Habitation
In-Space 
Habitat 
Duration
No. of 
Crew to 
Orbit
Pathway
Distant 
Retrograde 
Orbit (DRO)
Cis-Lunar 
Habitat
< 50 mt
Take Orion to 
Mars
Yes Direct Entry All Chemical / Cryogenic All Chemical / Cryogenic
Nitrogen 
Tetroxide (NTO) / 
Hydrazine
Monolithic 
Transit Hab
600 days 2
Deep Space Gateway 
(DSG) > 2-year Flyby > 
Long-Stay Surface
Near 
Rectilinear 
Halo Orbit 
(NRHO)
No Cis-Lunar 
Infrastructure
50 - 100 mt
Leave Orion 
in Orbit
No
Earth Orbit 
Capture
All Chemical / Storable All Chemical / Storable
Liquid Oxygen 
(LOX) / Methane
Modular 
Transit Hab
1000 days 3
DSG > 2-year Flyby > 
Short-Stay Surface
Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO)
100 - 200 mt
Lunar Orbit 
Capture
Nuclear Thermal Rocket 
(NTR)
NTR LOX / Hydrogen Combination 1200 days 4
DSG > 3-year Orbital > 
Long-Stay Surface
High Earth 
Orbit (HEO)
> 200 mt
Solar Electric Propulsion 
(SEP)
Hybrid SEP / Chem 5
DSG > 3-year Orbital > 
Short-Stay Surface
Hybrid SEP / Chem Hybrid SEP / Hypergols 6
Hybrid SEP / Hypergolic 
Propulsion (Hypergols)
Split SEP / Chem > 6
Split SEP / Chem
Quantum Vacuum 
Plasma Thruster (Q-
thruster)
Q-Drive SEP / Chem / Aerobrake
SEP / Chem / Aerobrake NEP
Nuclear Electric 
Propulsion (NEP)
Bimodal NTR
Bimodal NTR
Cis-Earth Infrastructure
Transportation
Deep Space
Destination
Mars Parking 
Orbit
Mars Orbit 
Insertion - 
Cargo
Mars Orbit 
Insertion - 
Crew
Mars Orbit 
Operations
Mars 
Descent 
Propellant
Ascent Vehicle 
Propellant -
From Earth
Ascent Vehicle 
Propellant -
From ISRU
MAV Payload 
Up
Earth 
Capture 
Orbit
Earth 
Return 
Scheme
Mars Pre-
Deployment
Descent to 
Earth's 
Surface
Earth Entry 
Vehicle
Mars Orbit 1-sol Propulsive Propulsive Minimal Storables Cryogenic LOX Only 0 kg
Direct Entry
(with Transit 
hab flyby)
Direct 
Entry
Consumables Direct Orion
Phobos 5-sol Aerobrake Aerobrake
Rendezvous / 
Transfer
Cryogenic Hypergol LOX Methane 250 kg DRO
Propulsive 
Capture
None
Separate 
System
Commercial
Mars' Surface 500 km Circular None None
Vehicle 
Refurbishment
Other LOX/Hydrogen > 250 kg NRHO Landers Combination
Combination Areosynchronous Other HEO
Earth Return 
Propellant
Lunar First
Areosynchronous
Mars Flyby
Backflip
Grand Tour
Fast
Earth Return
Transportation
Deep Space
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Table 1.  Mars Mission Decision Matrix (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Radiation Countermeasures
Design 
Considerations
First Surface 
Mission Date
Crew Surface 
Stay Time
No. of Crew 
to Surface
Lander 
Payload Size
(Metric Tons)
Landed Mass 
per 
Crewmember
(Metric Tons)
Lander Entry 
Type
Landing 
Location
Lander 
Altitude
Landing 
Accuracy
Passive Zero-G w/Exercise Psychology 2035
Short Stay
(1-60 sols)
2 18
18 mt lander:   
6.0 - 36.0 mt
Blunt Body Near Equator
- 6 km Mars 
Orbiter Laser 
Altimeter 
(MOLA)
< 100 m
Active
Artificial Short 
Arm
Medical 2037
Long Stay 
(300+ sols)
3 20
20 mt lander:   
6.7 - 40.0 mt
Mid Lift-to-
Drag (L/D)
Polar 0 km MOLA 100 m  - 1 km
Artificial Long 
Arm
Dust 2039 4 22
22 mt lander:   
7.3 - 44.0 mt
Inflatable Mid-Latitude + 2 km MOLA > 1 km
2041 + 5 25
25 mt lander:   
8.3 - 50.0 mt
Deployable
Northern 
Hemisphere
6 27
27 mt lander:   
9.0 - 54.0 mt
All Propulsive
Southern 
Hemisphere
> 6 30
30 mt lander:   
10.0 - 60.0 mt
Different for 
each mission
40
40 mt lander:   
13.3 - 80.0 mt
SurfaceHuman Health
ISRU Power
Habitat 
Type
Life 
Support
Planetary 
Outpost
Excursion 
Radius/ 
Exploration 
Zone
Length of 
Surface 
Stay
Planetary 
Sciences
Laboratory 
Sciences
ECLSS Trash Robotics
Landing 
Zone 
Surveys
Cargo Handling
Surface 
Communication
None Solar Monolithic Open
Different 
for Each 
Expedition
< 10 km 7 sols
Teleoperation of 
Instrument / 
Networks
None Open Containers
Low Latency 
Telerobotics
Orbital Crane/ Hoist Line of Sight
Demonstration 
Only
Nuclear Modular Closed
Single 
Outpost
10 - 100 km 14 sols
Recon Geology / 
Geophysiology
Basic Analysis / 
No Lab
50 - 75%
Closed
Recycle Autonomous Robotic Ramp Relay Satellite
Atmospheric 
Oxygen
RTG Inflatable
Multiple 
Outposts
> 100 km 30 sols Field Work
Moderate 
Geochemical + 
Life Science
75 - 90%
Closed
Combination
Crew 
Partnered
All-Terrain Hex-Limbed 
Extra-Terrestrial 
Explorer (ATHLETE)
Water from 
Regolith
Combination Rigid 90 sols
Drilling / 
Geophysical 
Tests
Full-Scale Life 
Science
> 90%
Closed
Other
Water from 
from 
Subsurface Ice
Local 
Features 
and 
Resources
300 - 500 
sols
Fabrication / 
Manufacturing
500 - 1000 
sols
Combination
> 1000 sols, 
overlapping 
crews
Export
Surface
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3. Interconnections and Complexity 
As shown above, human exploration of Mars may 
represent one of the most complex systems-of-systems 
engineering challenges that humans will undertake.  
The distance, energy, and time required to transport the 
mission crew from the surface of the Earth to Mars and 
back results in a complex, highly integrated 
architecture of new technologies and systems that must 
work together seamlessly.  An example of Mars 
architecture interconnectivity between major system 
elements and choices is depicted in Figure 1.  This 
figure shows where design relationships between 
system choices exist for various systems and 
subsystems of a typical Mars architecture.  In this 
figure, larger nodes indicate where more 
interconnectivity between design choices exists.  
These types of relationship diagrams can be useful 
since they show at a glance which nodes may drive the 
overall architecture more than others.  Two elements 
of a typical Mars architecture, the ascent vehicle and 
habitat, are further discussed below to illustrate the 
complex interconnectivity between Mars architecture 
systems. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Example Mars architecture interconnectivity. 
 
3.1 Interconnections – Mars Ascent Vehicle 
Perhaps one of the challenges that has the most 
impact on the architecture of a round-trip mission to 
Mars and back is that of ascending from the surface of 
Mars.  Ascent represents a significant challenge and is, 
in fact, more difficult and potentially riskier than 
previous Apollo missions (Table 2).   
Typical key characteristics for the Mars Ascent 
Vehicle (MAV) include long periods of dormancy, 
both in transit and on the surface, operability with 
limited maintenance and repair opportunities, large 
propellant loads with the desire for those propellants 
to be produced from local resources on Mars, large 
crew size, and the capability of seamlessly operating 
with the rest of the systems of the architecture in 
multiple environments. [3]  Additionally, it must be 
configured in a way that minimizes the landed center 
of gravity and allows for crew access. 
Table 2.  Ascent Vehicle Comparison – Moon 
(Apollo) vs. Mars. 
Driving 
Characteristic 
State of the 
Art (Apollo) 
Example  
MAV 
Crew size 2 4-6 
Ascent Delta-V 2 km/s 4-6 km/s 
Ascent Time 2 hours 24-72 hours 
Dormant Duration 4 days ~2000 days 
Propellant Load 2.5 mt 33-38 mt 
Propellant Type Earth Storable Soft Cryogenic 
External Interfaces Minimal Multiple 
Mission Mode With crew Pre-deployed 
Communication 
Delay 
2.5s 480-2400 s 
Power Generation Internal External 
 
When put into context with the remainder of the 
systems that must be transported to the surface of 
Mars, previous analyses [4] have indicated that the 
MAV represents the largest indivisible item to be 
landed and has complex interconnectivity with many 
components of the overall architecture.  Figure 2 
shows those major elements having strong 
connectivity with the MAV. [5] [6]  Some of these 
complexities and interrelationships between elements 
are listed below. 
• Launch Vehicle – the throw capacity along with 
the available launch vehicle shroud diameter 
places significant constraints on the ascent vehicle 
size (mass and volume).   
• Mission Type – drives the dormant and active 
times, thus driving overall system reliability. 
• Transportation – the design of the MAV, 
especially the system wet mass, is driven by the 
propellant choice and whether or not In Situ 
Resource Utilization (ISRU) is incorporated.  
This decision then drives lander size, transport 
element capability, and delivery time to Mars, as 
well as potential commonality with other 
elements of the architecture, such as the descent 
system or the in-space transportation elements. 
• ISRU – the ability to produce propellants locally 
on Mars as opposed to bringing them from Earth 
drives the size and need for cryogenic propellant, 
landing site selection, and power generation 
capabilities. 
• Human health – crew time as well as habitation 
functions drive the size of the ascent cabin, 
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which then drives the overall ascent stage size 
and propellant need. 
• Surface power – the design of the MAV, such as 
the choice of fuel type, can drive not only ISRU, 
but also the power needs for propellant 
conditioning. 
• Number of crew – drives the overall size of the 
ascent cabin and resulting vehicle size. 
• Mars orbit –the staging orbit used for the in-space 
transportation system significantly drives the 
ascent vehicle size; higher orbits desired for the 
in-space transportation system require more ascent 
delta-V, resulting in more propellant and volume.  
The orbit choice also impacts operational aspects 
such as launch windows and options for early 
ascent from the surface. 
• Exploration Zone/Mobility – drives the crew’s 
ability to don and doff Extravehicular Activity 
(EVA) suits, dust and planetary protection, and 
surface mobility, including pressurized rovers and 
access systems such as pressurized tunnels. 
• Landing Site –drives ISRU options.  Additionally, 
landing site latitude drives MAV performance, 
and landing site slope affects the MAV’s ability to 
lift-off from the lander launch platform. 
• Lander – the lander delivery capability, including 
mass and volume, is a significant driver for MAV 
capability and configuration. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Mars ascent architecture interconnectivity. 
 
3.2 Interconnections – Habitation 
Support of the crew during long-duration Mars 
missions provides another good example of 
interconnectivity between the various architectural 
elements. [7] [8]  Architecture solutions that can 
reduce the total mission duration, and thereby reduce 
crew exposure to the deep-space environment, are 
highly desired.  But expected propulsion capabilities 
and the physics and phasing required for round-trip 
Mars missions mean that durations will remain long, 
typically years in length.  Therefore, the habitat drives 
many aspects of a typical Mars architecture (Figure 3). 
• Mission Type – the type of mission drives the 
overall mission timeline and the resulting time 
required to get to Mars, explore, and then return to 
Earth.  This mission time has a significant impact 
on the overall habitat design, mass and volume. 
• Launch Vehicle –constraints including the throw 
mass, volume, and launch rate drive habitat design 
considerations such as monolithic or modular 
design, rigid or inflatable structures, or the number 
of pressurized elements. 
• Number of crew – drives the overall volume and 
logistics mass required. 
• Lander – for surface habitats, the lander delivery 
capability, including mass and volume, is a 
significant driver for surface missions. 
• Reuse – the decision on whether or not to reuse 
the habitat drives the mission type, logistics and 
launch support strategies. 
• Human Health – key driving aspects include 
radiation protection and medical and physiological 
countermeasures, as well as other overall human 
factors. 
• Life Support – as expected, the closure of the life 
support system significantly drives the 
consumables quantity, but it also drives other 
salient features of the habitat design, such as 
layout, to enable maintenance and repair of key 
life support systems throughout the mission. 
• Logistics – logistics supply and disposal strategy 
affects habitat design and layout. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Mars habitat architecture interconnectivity. 
4. Key Design Influences 
The previous section illustrates how every 
architecture is interconnected throughout the human 
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Mars mission design, and uses the MAV and habitat as 
illustrative examples.  Experience has shown that, of 
the many architectural decisions, a small number 
emerge as the decisions that most broadly influence 
human Mars mission architecture.  These design 
decisions often “frame” the architecture, and are 
sometimes given as constraints to designers, rather 
than as open design variables. 
 
4.1 End Game 
Perhaps the most fundamental impact on Mars 
mission architecture is whether a human Mars mission 
is intended as an Apollo-type sortie, an expedition to 
establish a scientific field station, or the beginning of a 
permanent human settlement.  A short stay “flags and 
footprints” mission may provide only limited mission 
return, but may be attractive because the price tag and 
time commitment are modest as compared to a 
permanent installation that requires future sustaining 
missions.  Many architectural technical decisions 
hinge on the long-term vision and commitment for the 
activities to be carried out on Mars, with flow-down 
impacts to much of the Mars surface architecture, 
operational concepts, and technology needs.  
 
4.2 Earth to Orbit Transportation 
A great deal of human space exploration 
investment is made in the quest to reduce mass and 
risk.  Entire technology programs are undertaken with 
the goal of reducing the ultimate mass of human Mars 
mission payloads launched from Earth – this is due to 
the fact that current launch economics accounts for the 
largest fraction of overall mission costs.  Efforts have 
continued over the past decades to lower the cost of 
delivering payloads to space, but these efforts have not 
yet succeeded to the point where payload mass can be 
decoupled from launch costs. 
If, at some point in the future, launch costs decline 
precipitously, entirely new space exploration 
architectures will emerge.  Mission architectures, 
spacecraft designs, and technology programs will no 
longer be focused on metrics such as the reduction of 
initial mass to low Earth orbit (IMLEO), and launch 
mass would no longer be a proxy for mission cost.  
Such a scenario would only be possible if current 
launch costs decline by another one or two orders of 
magnitude, but if such a scenario did occur it would 
transform the very nature of space exploration. 
 
4.3 In-Space Transportation 
Current in-space propulsion is based on decades-
old chemical and emerging electric propulsion 
technologies, augmented with recent incremental 
advances in efficiency.  The balance of thrust and 
specific impulse (Isp) continue to dominate the 
mission designer’s choice of propulsion system, and 
that choice has fundamental linkages into trip times, 
flight dynamics, arrival and departure orbits, launch 
packaging volume, and launch mass.  Low Isp, high 
thrust systems can provide impulsive “kicks” that 
shorten trip times at the expense of mass; electric 
propulsion can provide more efficient use of fuel mass 
at the expense of transit time duration.  Other in-space 
propulsion systems such as nuclear thermal propulsion 
provide moderate thrust and higher efficiency, but 
come with launch packaging and development 
challenges. 
The choice of in-space propulsion system has a 
large “systems” effect on the overall Mars architecture.  
In addition to the factors discussed above, the mission 
designer may choose to split cargo and crew 
propulsion to take advantage of less mass efficient, but 
shorter, transit time options for crew transit and longer, 
more efficient systems for cargo.  Hybrids that 
combine the best features of several propulsion 
systems also open intriguing design options. 
 
4.4 Landing Site Selection 
Landing site selection will influence virtually every 
aspect of Mars surface architecture as well as EDL 
constraints.  Landing site selection will impact the 
choice of parking orbit for orbital mission assets and 
the amount of plane change necessary to access the 
sites. Landing site selection will also affect the choice 
of surface power systems, with solar power becoming 
less available as latitude increases.  Additionally, the 
landing site may likely affect the availability of local 
resources, with valuable resources such as water being 
more available at higher latitudes.  The choice of 
landing site will also be impacted by the “end game” 
discussed above, with certain landing sites being more 
desirable for exploration missions, and others more 
suited for visits over multiple expeditions. 
 
4.5 Space Resource Utilization 
Every space mission to date has relied on supplies 
launched from Earth.  A fundamental shift in space 
exploration will occur as humans begin to utilize 
resources from space to reduce the dependence on 
Earth.  ISRU will, literally, change the equations of 
how humans explore space – by producing needed 
consumables such as water, oxygen, and rocket fuels, 
the efficiency of human Mars missions will increase 
dramatically.  Ultimately, less of these products will 
need to be shipped from Earth, reducing payloads, 
lander size, entry vehicle requirements, in-space transit 
mass and launch mass.  Readily available supplies of 
resources and consumables may also decrease mission 
risk, enable alternate propulsion options, and enable 
expanded use of ISRU materials for advanced uses 
such as radiation shielding and habitat construction.  
ISRU use may also require that higher levels of power 
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may be required for resource extraction, production 
and storage. 
 
5. Starting Point 
To form a starting point for a basis of comparison 
for a crewed Mars mission architecture, decisions must 
be made to convey a logical sequence of trades and 
design choices.  The approach to developing ground 
rules for such trades includes selecting the crucial 
technical considerations for both Mars transportation 
and Mars surface infrastructure.  A discussion should 
include assessments of the trades for each critical 
component of the architecture, the practicality of the 
choice, and a strong rationale as to why a given choice 
was made.  A list of trades follows, along with the 
preferred options obtains by discussion with Mars 
mission subject matter experts (SMEs). 
 
5.1 Transportation Trades 
Current trades and design choices must start with 
the elements which are currently under development, 
namely the crew and cargo variations of the Space 
Launch System (SLS) launch vehicles, the Orion 
spacecraft (which will serve as the primary mode of 
crew transportation between Earth and cis-lunar 
space), and the Deep Space Gateway.  These current 
elements influence certain key transportation trades:  
 
5.1.1 Transportation Mission Architecture  
The required mission elements can all be sent to 
Mars on the same injection opportunity, arriving at 
Mars at nearly the same time.  Alternately, some of the 
crew-support elements can be pre-deployed to Martian 
orbit or the surface several years prior to crew arrival.  
Having all elements arrive at approximately the same 
time at Mars minimizes the in-space lifetime 
requirements.  However, element failure (either the 
element itself or transportation) can have an 
unrecoverable effect on the mission, since no 
replacement can be immediately dispatched from 
Earth.  A “pre-deployment” strategy can ensure 
functioning elements prior to crew arrival and can 
“level” the launch campaign at a cost of less-frequent 
missions.  In addition, pre-deployment of surface 
assets can allow ISRU production in advance of the 
crew’s arrival. 
The SME preferred option consists of Mars surface 
equipment and crew landing systems being pre-
deployed the injection opportunity prior to crew 
arrival.  This allows verification of arrival and correct 
functionality prior to crew departure from Earth.  In 
addition, pre-deployed elements can take advantage of 
more efficient (but slower) transits to Mars than 
utilized by the crew delivery. 
 
5.1.2 Transfer Habitation Functionality 
The in-space crew habitat could also perform the 
function of surface habitat.  Alternatively, specialized 
habitats can be designed for either in-space or surface 
functionality, with transfer of crew from one to the 
other in the Mars system.  Unique development costs 
could be reduced by combining in-space and surface 
habitat designs.  However, disparate operational 
environments (e.g., thermal, gravity, acceleration) and 
functionality (e.g., EVA support, science) may make 
common development/design challenging.  Some 
space transportation options suggest integrating the 
transportation system and habitation vehicle, further 
complicating common design. 
The option to optimize habitats for in-space and 
surface applications is favored by the SME 
community.  The unique environments and 
functionality indicate that a common design and 
development would be difficult.  Operationally, the 
crew would be transferred to the surface habitat in 
Mars orbit and descent/land in it. 
 
5.1.3 Entry, Descent and Landing (EDL) Commonality 
Mars EDL systems could be tailored for individual 
payloads or a common system could be designed to 
handle most/all required surface payloads.  Mars EDL 
system designs are generally dependent upon landed 
payload mass and volume.  Uniquely tailoring an EDL 
system for each payload could result in a lowest mass 
system, but a “common” EDL system could reduce 
development costs. 
Mars EDL systems are generally regarded as high-
cost, high-risk developments.  Analysis indicates that 
crew and surface cargo delivery can be manifested into 
similar payload mass volume envelopes.  The SMEs 
prefer a common EDL system for all surface payloads, 
MAV and crew descent/landing. 
 
5.1.4 Mars Rendezvous Orbit 
The split-mission strategy (see section 5.1, 
“Transportation Mission Architecture”) implies that a 
rendezvous location in the Mars system is necessary 
for crew transfer to the landing system, and, 
potentially, to the integration of the return propulsion 
systems.  This rendezvous location has conflicting 
implications for in-space and surface systems.  High 
Mars orbit is preferred for systems that transit to/from 
Earth, since it reduces the propulsion requirements 
(i.e., propellant mass) for those systems.  Low Mars 
orbit is preferred for the ascending MAV to minimize 
MAV propellant requirements.  Individual orbits could 
be optimized for each, but would necessitate a 
specialized vehicle to transfer crew between high and 
low orbits. 
Use of a high Mars orbit to reduce propulsion 
requirements for systems that transit to/from Earth is 
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favored by the SMEs.  ISRU production of MAV 
propellant greatly reduces the impact of high orbit on 
the MAV mass.  The necessity for a unique crew 
orbital transfer vehicle is viewed as undesirable and 
has been eliminated by this choice. 
 
5.1.5 Earth Departure Aggregation Orbit 
Some of the Mars mission payloads (e.g., crew 
transit spacecraft) are too large for direct injection to 
Mars with a single SLS launch.  Aggregation/assembly 
somewhere in Earth orbit or the Earth-Moon system is 
therefore necessary.  The optimal location depends 
upon in-space and launch vehicle propulsion system 
characteristics and could potentially impact other 
exploration objectives. 
A Low Earth Orbit (LEO) assembly orbit 
maximizes the SLS payload, but high-thrust, high 
efficiency propulsion is needed for the Trans-Mars 
Injection (TMI) maneuver which, for chemical 
systems, implies cryogenic oxygen/ hydrogen.  The 
technology development for storage of these “hard” 
cryogens over times needed for aggregation/assembly 
is not currently planned.  An option is to 
“immediately” utilize the oxygen/hydrogen 
performance of the SLS upper stage and boost the 
payloads to a higher orbit, where the TMI requirements 
are greatly reduced. 
High Earth Orbit or cis-lunar locations are 
consistent with electric propulsion capabilities (the 
currently preferred propulsion option, see section 5.6, 
“In-Space Propulsion”), both for TMI and for Earth 
return. 
The staging orbit must also be consistent with SLS 
and Orion capabilities for crew delivery (and retrieval, 
see section 5.7, “Earth Return”).  And finally, there 
may be other exploration requirements and mission 
objectives that influence the assembly/aggregation 
location (e.g., lunar exploration, asteroid retrieval, 
etc.). 
SMEs agree that a cis-lunar location - currently a 
“Near Rectilinear Halo Orbit” which meets electric 
propulsion departure/ return capabilities, SLS/Orion 
access and a potential staging point for lunar surface 
missions – is the optimal choice. 
 
5.1.6 In-Space Propulsion 
The choice of in-space propulsion will affect 
mission performance, development costs and risk. 
Trades among propulsion technologies include: 
1. Traditional in-space chemical propulsion (e.g., 
space-storable) has insufficient performance for 
crewed Mars missions.  The technology for long-
duration in-space storage of high-performance 
chemical “hard cryogens” (oxygen/hydrogen) is 
not currently available.  Development of this 
technology could affect the attractiveness of this 
option. 
2.  “Soft-cryogens” (e.g., oxygen/methane) may 
provide a reasonable compromise among 
efficiency, thrust and space-storability.  Moderate 
levels of cryo-cooling may allow long duration 
(years) storage.  
3. Electric propulsion has space-storable propellant, is 
highly efficient, and shares applicability with 
advanced robotics missions, but for power levels 
consistent with photovoltaic systems, it exhibits 
relatively low thrust levels. 
4. Nuclear thermal propulsion exhibits high thrust and 
high efficiency, but again requires a “hard cryogen” 
propellant and introduces the cost/risk/political 
challenges associated with nuclear systems. 
 
SMEs prefer solar-powered electric propulsion for 
the interplanetary cruise with integrated oxygen-
methane propulsion for orbit injection maneuvers.  
This provides good balance between efficiency and 
development effort.  Oxygen-methane is also preferred 
for MAV propulsion (consistent with Mars ISRU), so 
engine commonality is a possibility.  The performance 
of this combination may result in a non-staging, 
reusable propulsion system for round-trip crewed Mars 
missions. 
 
5.1.7 Earth Return 
Crew return following the Mars mission can be via 
a direct-return to Earth in an Orion-style entry vehicle.  
Alternately, the transit habitat can brake into the Earth-
Moon system and the crew can be retrieved via a 
vehicle launched from Earth.  Direct entry from the 
returning interplanetary trajectory requires 
transporting the entry vehicle round-trip to the Mars 
system and back.  This implies additional propellant 
requirements on the transit spacecraft and unique 
lifetime and environmental requirements on the entry 
vehicle (e.g., years in deep space).  In addition, Earth 
entry velocities returning from Mars are typically 
higher than returning from Earth-Moon space, 
implying more stringent heat shield requirements.  
However, decelerating the transit habitat also implies 
additional propellant requirements.  The severity 
depends on the transit propulsion efficiency and the 
target location in Earth-Moon space. 
Because the proposed solar-electric in-space 
propulsion system (see “In-Space Propulsion” above) 
is highly efficient and because reuse of the transit 
spacecraft is an architectural goal, consensus of the 
SMEs is for the transfer vehicle to be decelerated into 
the Earth-Moon system.  The target orbit (see “Earth 
Departure/Aggregation Orbit”) allows combinations 
of lunar gravity assists, low-thrust and high-thrust for 
efficient capture.  Crew retrieval would be via 
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Orion/SLS launch after the crew returns to Earth-
Moon space.  This should require no augmentation to 
Orion currently planned capabilities. 
 
5.1.8 Launch Vehicle Cadence 
The SLS launch cadence is not an architectural 
trade.  The constraints are based on the SLS Program 
capabilities.  The SLS Program has access to a single 
launch pad and a single Mobile Launch Platform 
(MLP).  This implies that a launch must occur and the 
MLP be returned to the Vehicle Assembly Building 
(VAB) before the stacking of the subsequent launch 
vehicle can commence.  Engine, booster and stage 
production capability are currently limited to 
supporting two flights per year.  Two SLS launches per 
year marginally supports one Mars surface mission 
every 52 months.  A launch cadence of up to three per 
year would add resiliency and contingency to crewed 
Mars mission needs, but would still likely still only 
support missions every 52 months. 
 
5.2 Mars Surface Strategy Trades 
When considering the trade options, it is important 
to understand how the options govern other 
components of the overall architecture (e.g., how EDL 
vehicle sizing governs the SLS launch cadence).  
Furthermore, transportation mission architecture 
trades can influence the Mars surface strategy and the 
asset deployment sequence.  Key Mars surface strategy 
trades include: 
 
5.2.1 Single Central Site vs. Multiple Dispersed Sites 
When multiple crewed Mars surface missions are 
envisioned, each landing could target the same site, or 
instead target multiple, geographically diverse sites.  
Multiple sites could provide access to, and 
investigations of, widely diverse geology and climates, 
but each mission would essentially be “starting over” 
as far as surface infrastructure is concerned.  
Concentrating multiple missions at a single, localized 
location would allow a build-up of exploration 
infrastructure, allowing more comprehensive local 
exploration and resource utilization. 
Experts agree that establishment of a single 
location for a sequence of missions with robust surface 
mobility is the best option.  Strategic location 
combined with regional mobility, on the order of 100 
km. per traverse, could provide sufficient exploration 
potential and geological diversity.  Robust habitation, 
power, and resource utilization capabilities should 
result due to sequential buildup of deployed assets. 
 
5.2.2 Surface Mobility Capability 
Mars surface mobility capabilities can range from crew 
in spacesuits travelling only a few kilometers (as with 
the early Apollo lunar missions) all the way to 
extended durations using pressurized rovers capable of 
100’s of kilometers in traverses.   
Crewed surface mobility utilizing only spacesuits is 
constrained by the operational limitations of the suit’s 
portable life support system (PLSS) and the endurance 
of the crewmember; ranges of only a few kilometers 
are likely to result.  Crew incapacitation and 
incapability to return to the habitat is a risk. 
Unpressurized rovers similar to the ones utilized by 
the later Apollo missions can extend traverse distances 
to 10’s of kilometers due to their speed and the 
reduction in crew fatigue.  Excursion time is still 
constrained by the PLSS and “crew-in-suits” 
limitations, and the maximum traverse radius may still 
be limited to crew “walk-back” distance in the event of 
rover breakdown.   
Pressurized rovers can extend exploration duration 
to weeks and distance to 100’s of kilometers, but 
represent a much greater investment in mass and 
power.  Dual rover operations can provide 
rescue/backup in case one rover breaks down.  
Studies show that dual pressurized rovers with 
~100 km of roving capability per traverse provide the 
best overall capabilities.  Long duration surface 
missions run the risk of depleting exploration 
productivity in a short time without extended surface 
ranging capability. 
 
5.2.3 ISRU Emphasis 
Utilization of Martian resources can greatly reduce 
mission mass delivery requirements, but imply the 
upfront need for ISRU technology development, 
equipment delivery, and increased surface power.  In 
addition, landing site selection may be restricted if 
localized resources are required.  Recent robotic 
missions have indicated that substantial subsurface 
water ice may be accessible.  However, this would 
require additional infrastructure and power and would 
to some extent impose location constraints on the 
exploration site. 
SMEs favor a strategy to extract oxygen from 
atmospheric carbon dioxide for production of MAV 
ascent oxidizer starting with the first crewed mission.  
The resulting mass reduction more than offsets the 
mass of the production equipment and the needed 
power generation can also be utilized by other surface 
elements.  Extraction of water from subsurface ice 
could follow if outpost activities expand. 
 
5.2.4 Crew Size 
The number of crewmembers on a Mars mission 
has implications for mission productivity, 
transportation, mass and power requirements.  Mars 
missions will likely be international in composition 
and partner representation on the crew may feature 
heavily in the level of the partners’ participation.  
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Larger crew size implies a more robust skill mix and 
“redundancy” in case of incapacitation of a 
crewmember.  However, a larger crew also implies 
increased habitation volume and mass, more 
consumables and more power. 
The SMEs felt that, as with ISS, the initial crew size 
would be limited (4 crewmembers) with expansion 
(6+) as additional habitation, power and resources 
become available (see above trade on “Single Site vs. 
Multiple Sites” and subsequent trade on “Surface 
Habitation Architecture”).  This would allow 
participation by international crew members reflecting 
the level of contributions. 
 
5.2.5 Surface Power Systems 
Power capacity and generation options on the 
Martian surface have implications for ISRU 
production rates, the number of crewmembers that can 
be supported, resiliency to environmental extremes, 
and system development costs.  Photovoltaic systems 
have relatively low development costs, but the low 
solar insolation on the Martian surface (1.4 to 1.6 AU 
from the sun, varying elevation) implies large array 
sizes, and the probability of dust storms make power 
storage requirements nearly impractical (tau levels of 
4 or 5 have been recorded).  Nuclear power systems 
provide constant output and are independent of solar 
insolation, but may have high development and 
production costs. 
The Use of nuclear “kilopower” units (up to 5 units 
of 10 kWe each) is preferred by the SMEs.  A major 
consideration was the above mentioned probability of 
dust storms during long surface missions, along with 
the ability to remotely site multiple units without long 
cable runs. 
 
5.2.6 Earth Communication 
Techniques for communication between the 
Martian surface and Earth have implications on data 
rates, availability, and requirements for relays.  Direct 
Martian surface-to-Earth communications will 
experience long periods of unavailability (>12 hrs/day) 
due to Mars rotation and data rate limitations due to the 
requirement for radio frequency (RF) links.  Properly 
positioned orbital relay(s) can provide higher 
percentage communications coverage and higher data 
rates but required dedicated satellite(s) and 
deployment(s). 
Areosynchronous relays satellite(s) with RF link to 
the surface outpost and laser communications to Earth, 
enabling nearly constant communications coverage 
and high data rates, seems to be the best option. 
 
5.2.7 Surface Habitation Architecture 
Long duration surface habitats can be deployed 
prior to crew arrival with the crew landing in the MAV.  
Alternately, the surface habitat can transport the crew 
from Mars orbit to the surface.  Having habitation 
operational upon arrival of the crew offers 
considerable advantages, as the crew may well be 
suffering from microgravity deconditioning.  Descent 
aborts using the MAV are generally not feasible, 
especially if ISRU production of propellant is 
envisioned, so crew descent/landing in the MAV 
provides little advantage.  In addition, the MAV tends 
to have limited functionality and habitability due to 
mass constraints, so it is less than an ideal environment 
for the crew to readapt from deconditioning.  Landing 
in a habitat that can be readily made functional avoids 
the need for the crew to don/doff spacesuits, perform 
surface traverses, etc. 
The SME preferred option consists of the crew 
descending and landing in a surface habitat which can 
be configured for surface operations immediately post-
landing, reducing the physical stresses to the 
deconditioned crew.  A pre-deployed functional 
habitat provides backup and enhanced surface 
capabilities (lab, EVA support, etc.). 
 
5.2.8 Transfer amongst Surface Elements 
Crew transfer amongst a surface habitat, 
pressurized rover and MAV can be accomplished via 
suited EVA or in “shirt-sleeves” via pressurized 
connections. Pressurized access to the MAV from the 
pressurized rover via a pressurized tunnel allows 
lighter, smaller volume pressure suits for 
descent/ascent. 
The SME community has determined that 
pressurized access between the surface habitat and a 
pressurized rover, allowing simplified and time-
efficient transitions to surface mobility operations, is 
the best choice.  Subsequent EVAs would utilize the 
pressurized rover egress system (e.g., suitlock).  
Lightweight tunnel design concepts appear attainable. 
 
5.2.9 Spacesuit Commonality 
Requirements exist for crew pressure suits which 
encompass Mars descent/ascent (within the habitat or 
MAV) and Mars surface activities.  A question exists 
as to whether a single suit design can accommodate all 
requirements.  A single suit design could reduce 
development costs and total mass/volume required for 
the mission; however, the operational requirements are 
significantly different between landing/ascent and 
surface operations.  A Mars surface suit/PLSS is 
expected to require significant stowage volume as it 
may include hard elements.  Since the pressurized 
volume of the MAV will likely be extremely limited 
and the environmental requirements (MAV 
depressurization) significantly less demanding, 
separate suit designs may be more advantageous. 
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Specialized entry/launch pressure suits for the 
MAV volumetric constraints and environment are 
preferred by the SMEs.  Transfer from/to the MAV 
would be accommodated by pressurized access via 
rovers and pressurized tunnels (see “Transfer amongst 
Surface Elements”). 
 
5.2.10 Mars Ascent Vehicle Scale 
The Mars surface cargo will influence the size and 
complexity of the EDL system.  Dividing the cargo 
into smaller landed packages may drive the scale of the 
EDL to have commonality with that of Mars robotic 
missions, which could lead to lower or shared 
development costs.  The crew habitation elements can 
conceivably be subdivided for entry and landing then 
assembled on the surface, but with increased 
operational complexity.  Consumables, power systems, 
rovers, etc. can be distributed onto smaller landers.  
The MAV represents the largest “indivisible” payload 
and even then, one could envision landing the 
propellant separately and transferring it into the MAV 
on the surface, or producing it in situ, although this 
obviously has safety and operational complexity 
implications. 
The SME prefer the option of landing the MAV 
fueled (for oxygen-methane, the methane makes up 
~25% of the propellant mass) and producing the 
oxidizer in situ.  This was deemed to be a good trade 
between mass and surface operational complexity.  
This results in a landed mass of 20-25 metric tons. 
 
6. Basis of Comparison  
The previous sections have described the complex 
network of interconnected design choices, systems 
analyses, technical optimizations, and non-technical 
compromises that must be considered when planning 
a viable human mission to the surface of Mars.  
NASA continues, along with their partners and 
stakeholders, to conduct or sponsor studies of human 
exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, taking various 
pathways through this complex network.  These 
studies are being used to understand requirements for 
human exploration of the Moon and Mars in the 
context of other space missions and research and 
development programs.  To anchor a “basis of 
comparison” for exploring other paths within the 
mission design menu/tree that might explore new 
technologies, alternate cost or risk postures, or new 
additions to the design option space, NASA 
periodically defines a design reference architecture 
(DRA).  These DRAs are not intended to be the 
program plan for human exploration of the Moon and 
Mars, but instead are meant to provide a viable end-
to-end reference against which other concepts can be 
compared.  The results from these comparisons are 
then used by NASA to: 
• Derive technology research and development 
plans; 
• Define and prioritize requirements for precursor 
robotic missions; 
• Define and prioritize potential flight experiments 
and human exploration mission elements, such as 
those involving the International Space Station 
(ISS), lunar surface systems, and space 
transportation; 
• Open a discussion with international partners in a 
manner that allows identification of potential 
interests of the participants in specialized aspects 
of the missions; 
• Provide educational materials at all levels that can 
be used to explain various aspects of human 
interplanetary exploration; and to 
• Describe to the public, the media, and other 
federal government organizations the feasible, 
long-term visions for space exploration. 
 
To guide studies over the next several years, 
NASA will establish a set of ground rules and 
assumptions to examine one particular approach to 
the human exploration of Mars that will form the 
basis for the next Design Reference Architecture. 
One principal example of these ground rules and 
assumptions is a choice to concentrate all surface 
assets needed to support human exploration at a 
single location and then send all crews to this site for 
all missions that make up the DRA. This contrasts 
with the scenario considered in Design Reference 
Architecture 5.0 (DRA 5.0), in which a campaign of 
three missions sends crews to three separate stand-
alone locations on Mars. 
NASA introduced the concept of an Exploration 
Zone (EZ) and a Region of Interest (ROI) as a 
mechanism to help organize the key criteria used to 
identify candidate sites on Mars for this single base of 
operations for human crews.  NASA will use the EZ 
concept as part of a multi-year effort to determine 
where and how humans could explore Mars.  In the 
near term, this process includes: (a) identifying 
locations that would maximize the potential science 
return from future human exploration missions, (b) 
identifying locations with the potential for resources 
required to support humans, (c) developing concepts 
and engineering systems needed by future human 
crews to conduct operations within a candidate 
location, (d) identifying key characteristics of the 
proposed candidate locations that cannot be evaluated 
using existing data sets, thus helping to define 
precursor measurements needed in advance of human 
missions, and (e) using the resulting surface 
exploration strategy to help drive the overall 
transportation and operational exploration 
architecture.  This choice of a single surface site has 
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already resulted in an important observation, in that 
the EZ lends itself to a “field station” approach for 
development of a centralized habitation zone / 
landing site.  In this context, a working definition of a 
“field station” is as follows. [9] 
 
Field stations create a bridge between natural 
environments and (Earth-based) research 
laboratories.  Research laboratories offer 
considerable power to conduct analyses in a 
predictable environment and to infer cause 
and effect from manipulative experiments, 
but they may miss factors that turn out to be 
critical in a natural environment.  Field 
studies can encompass the full range of 
relevant interactions and scales, but they are 
not as tightly controlled.  By offering access 
to both laboratories and field environments, 
Field Stations combine the best of both 
worlds. 
 
This is but one example of observations and 
recommendations that will become apparent as more 
of the options discussed above are examined in the 
context of a full human exploration architecture and 
as technological innovations emerge.  The roadmap 
that NASA and its partners will follow through cis-
lunar space to pioneer Mars will emerge from this 
work. 
 
7. Conclusions  
A human Mars architecture is a complex, 
interconnected series of choices.  While every 
architectural decision is important to the definition of 
the overall architecture, not all architectural decisions 
carry the same “weight” in terms of the other 
architecture variable that they affect.  In particular, 
the choice of the Mars surface “end state”, the 
economics of Earth launch, the choice of in-space 
transportation technology, the choice of Mars landing 
site, and the use (or not) of local resources have the 
greatest impact across the overall architecture. 
The human Mars architecture can be thought of in 
two parts – transportation from Earth to Mars (and 
back, in the case of an exploration crew), and 
operations in the gravity well, including landing, 
surface operations and ascent.  Each these two parts 
are shown in this paper in two ways – first as tables of 
options, and later as a discussion of those decisions 
that could serve as a starting point for an architecture 
that incorporates current technology work, Mars 
science, and agency options for operations in cis-
lunar space.  Taken together, compelling human Mars 
architectures begin to emerge from the multitude of 
design options.  Work is continuing at NASA to 
explore innovative human Mars mission design 
options, and to establish a set of mission design 
decisions that can be used as a basis of comparison 
for future studies.   
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